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A system of free expression can be successful only when it rests
upon the strongest possible commitment to the positive right and
the narrowest possible basis for exceptions. And any such excep-
tions must be clear-cut, precise and readily controlled.2
On December 10, 1991, the United States Supreme Court struck
down New York Executive Law section 632-a as "inconsistent" with
the First Amendment of the Constitution.3 The decision marked the
end of over two years of litigation and extensive debate among com-
mentators.4 The statute had required that income the criminals re-
ceived for telling their stories be held in an escrow account. The
funds were held to guarantee payment of civil judgments to their
victims.5 Simon & Schuster, the publishing giant, had challenged
the law as an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech. Si-
mon & Schuster contended that criminals who could not receive im-
mediate compensation would be deterred from publishing their
2. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 889 (1963).
3. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512.
4. See generally Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Note, Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Chal-
lenge?, 66 Nomm Dim L. Rsv. 1075 (1991); Jeanne E. Dugan, Comment, Crime
Doesn't Pay-Or Does It?: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 65 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
981 (1991); Sue S. Okuda, Comment, Criminal Ant'profit Laws: Some Thoughts in
Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1353 (1988); John Timothy Loss,
Note, Criminals Selling Their Stories: The First Amendment Requires Legislative
Reexamination, 72 CoRmEL L. REv. 1331 (1987); Angela Cartwright, Case Note,
Crime Doesn't Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Proft From a Criminal's Story:
Fassching v. Kallinger, No. L-069197-83, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 24,
1985), 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 831 (1987); Michele Del Russo Murphy, Note, Victims'
Compensation: Congress Acts to Make Sure Crime Doesn't Pay-Sometimes, 7
Loy. ENT. L.J. 201 (1987); Patricia Nicole Gillard, Comment, The Expansion of Vic-
tim Compensation Programs: Today's "Son of Sam" Legislation and Its Susceptibil-
ity to, Constitutional Challenge, 18 U. TOL. L. Rzv. 155 (1986); Thomas M. Kelly,
Note, Where Offenders Pay For Their Crimes: Victim Restitution and Its Constitu-
tionality, 59 NomRE DAm L. Rzv. 685 (1984); Martin S. Goldberg, Note, Publication
Rights Agreements in Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response to the Problem, 68
CoRN= L. REv. 686 (1983); Comment, Alabama's Anti-Profit Statute: A Recent
Trend in Victim Compensation, 33 Aul. L. REv. 109 (1981); Joel Rothman, Com-
ment, In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches to the Problem of the Offender as Au-
thor, 71 J. Ceum. L. & CmmoiooY 255 (1980); Richard Allen Inz, Comment,
Compensating the Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story-The Constitu-
tionality of the New York Approach, 14 CoL.um. J. L. & Soc. PRos. 93 (1978).
5. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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stories.8
This Comment reviews the Supreme Court's decision and urges
the Court to recognize the protection of expression related to issues
of public debate, "political speech," as the primary objective of the
First Amendment. This Comment further suggests that the guaran-
tee of public debate would be strengthened by reserving the appli-
cation of the strict scrutiny standard exclusively to viewpoint-based
restrictions. A limitation upon strict scrutiny is necessary because
continued application of strict scrutiny review via the general deter-
ruination that a regulation is content-based creates the possibility
that the strength of the protection afforded by the standard will be
"diluted." Part I describes the factual background and legislative
history of the "Son of Sam" law, as well as how it operated. Part H
reviews the creation of Wiseguy: Life of a Mafia Family,7 the book
that was the basis of the case, presents the procedural history of the
case and examines the arguments before the Supreme Court. Part
HI discusses the Supreme Court's decision. Part IV describes view-
point-based restrictions and argues that the New York statute was
the equivalent of such restriction. Further it contends that the Court
should recognize that the prime purpose of the First Amendment is
to protect "political speech" and that strict scrutiny should be re-
served for reviews of viewpoint-based restrictions. This Comment
concludes that freedom of expression is the guardian of our demo-
cratic system of government and requires the greatest safeguards as
well as substantial sacrifices.
I. NEW YORK'S "SON OF SAM" LAW
In recent years, the public's interest in crime and criminals has
resulted in the enormous success of books such as Mayflower
MadamI and Trading Secrets9 and films such as The Godfather Part
MrI," Goodfelas, and The Silence of the Lambs."2 This fascina-
6. See intre notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
7. N. P-. Go, WISouvy: Lum OF A MmA FAmmy (1985).
8. S.B. BARwow, MdviowER MADAM: TmE Sscn.r LIFE OF SYmy BmDLE BARRoWS
(1986) (autobiography of madam operating million dollar prostitution ring).
9. R.F. WwAms, TRwnwo SECrs (1984) (Wall Street Journal columnists con-
victed of securities fraud and conspiracy to defraud).
10. THE GODFATHER PART II (Paramount Pictures 1990).
11. GoonFE~us (Warner Bros. 1990). The movie was nominated for six Acad-
emy Awards, including best picture. See Gary Arnold, Oscar Juggernaut?, WASH.
Tums, Feb. 14, 1991, at 2E. It won for best supporting actor. 7he Oscar Winners,
N.Y. Tamzs, Mar. 17, 1991, at A20. It won the best picture and best director awards
given by the Los Angeles Film Critics Association, the New York Film Critics Asso-
ciation, and the National Society of Film Critics. The Oscar Plunge: And The Other
Winners Were... ,L.A. TuEs, Mar. 24, 1991, at 6. Goodfellas was also nominated
for the Writers Guild of America Award for Best Screenplay Based on Material
from Another Medium. UzMnM PRESS INT'L, Feb. 19, 1991. It won the best film, best
director, and best adapted screenplay awards given by the British Academy of Film
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tion is not a new phenomenon; writings and movies about and by
criminals are a staple of our literary heritage and cinematic tradi-
tion.1 3 The sheer volume of works available illustrates the public's
insatiable curiosity.14 In order to feed this curiosity, the media has
courted criminals with substantial financial incentives.15 Objection
to the enrichment of one such criminal produced the backdrop for
the Court's recent decision.
A. The "Son of Sam"
In the spring and summer of 1977, New York City was terrorized
by a series of random shootings of young women and their escorts.
At the time of his arrest, serial killer David Berkowitz was known
and Television Arts. Michael Blowen, And the Winner is.... BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
19, 1991, at 54.
12. Tim SILEcE oF Trm Liuam (Orion 1991).
13. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 686 n.2 (citing Fedler, When Headlines Are
Brought, BumusTm= 14, 49 (Fall 1980)); see Brief for Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4-5, Simon & Schuster,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1992) (No. 90-1059) [hereinafter MPAA Brief]; BRucE FRwmm,
PRuSoN Lr=RATuRE i AIE:RucA (1989).
14. The public's demand for crime stories has also seized the television market.
See, e.g., William C. Trott, Nussbaum Suit, UNrrE PRESS INT'L, Apr. 13, 1989 (on
CBS -iniseries on the conviction of Joel Steinberg for beating to death an illegally
adopted child); Howard Rosenberg, 7Te "Boys Club" and Trial by T.V., L.A. Tnam,
Nov. 6, 1987, (Calendar) at 1, (review of NBC -ninseries about Joe Hunt, the head
of an affluent investment group who was charged with the murder of Ron Levin);
Harry F. Waters, A Haunting "Fatal Vision," NEwswzm, Nov. 19, 1984, at 95 (re-
view of NBC -inseries about Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald, convicted of the murder of
his family); Howard Rosenberg, "Stranger". Cold Look at a Killer, L.A. Tums, May
3, 1986, (Calendar) at 12 (review of NBC television movie about Theodore Bundy,
convicted for murdering two women and a 12-year-old girl and suspected of 36
other sex crimes). See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Association of Ameri-
can Publishers, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at Appendix, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059)
[hereinafter AAP Brief].
15. Because of the confidentiality of agreements, it is difficult to determine pre-
cisely how much criminals have received; however, reported figures are hefty, to
say the least. Macmillan, Inc. paid Jean Harris, the murderer of Dr. Herman
Tarnower, a prominent diet doctor, a $50,000 advance for her book STRornE M
Two WoRmDs. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 545 (N.Y.
1991). See also Martin S. Goldberg, Note, Publication Rights Agreemenfs in Sen-
sational Criminal Cases. A Response to the Problems, 68 CoRN=wL L. REv. 686, 687
n.4 (1983) (discussion of compensation in various publication agreements for crime
stories); USA TODAY, Jan. 9-11, 1987, at 1A, 2A (convicted murderer Rosewell Gil-
bert and his attorney received $50,000 for the rights to MERCY OR MURDER? WHAT
THE 'IeS A Guy GONNA Do?); Jonathan Yardley, Mass Media Murder Mania,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 22, 1986, at C2 (The attorney for Robert E. Chambers, Jr., who
murdered Jennifer Levin in New York's Central Park in 1986, received over one
hundred offers for movies and television films within one month of the murder.);
Wallace Turner, Patricia Hearst Drops Attempt to Win New Trial, N.Y. Tnmms, Jan. 7,
1982, at Al5 (reporting that Patricia Hearst was paid $700,000 for her story).
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only by his alias: "Son of Sam." 16 His senseless and brutal spree
left six people dead and seven wounded. However, even before
Berkowitz's arrest, rumors spread that the rights to his story would
make the "Son of Sam" a wealthy man.17 The New York legislature,
repulsed by the possibility of a vicious murderer making millions by
exploiting the pain and suffering of his victims," decided to take
action. 19
B. Legislative History
On August 11, 1977, one day after the arrest of David Berkowitz,
Executive Law section 632-a, entitled "Distribution of moneys re-
ceived as a result of the commission of crime," was signed by Gov-
ernor Hugh Carey and enacted into law.20 The law was a direct
16. The nickname "Son of Sam" was coined by the press, for the anonymous
murderer, after a note signed "Son of Sam" was found at the scene of an April 17,
1977, murder. See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 686 n.2. (citing Winfrey,"Son of
Sam" Case Poses Thorny Issues for Press, N.Y. Tumr, Aug. 22, 1977, at 1, 38.
David Berkowitz's arraignment in the late summer of 1977 was the culmination of
the "most intensive manhunt in the New York City Police Department's history."
WASH. PosT, Aug. 11, 1977, at Al; N.Y. Tmns, Aug. 11, 1977, at Al. The public's
fascination with crime is further illustrated by the massive interest in the arrest of
David Berkowitz. The New York Post's issue covering the capture of the "Son of
Sam" killer sold one million copies, compared to normal daily sales of 600,000;
similiarly, the New York Daily News sold 350,000 copies more than its regular
daily sales. Fedler, supra note 13, at 15.
17. See In re Berkowitz, 103 Misc. 2d 823, 824 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
18. See Jeanne E. Dugan, Comment, Crime Doesn't Pay-Or Does It?: Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 65 ST. JoiN's L. Rv. 981, 982 (1990); see also Frank
Trippett, On The Springboard of Notoriety, TndE, Oct. 12, 1987, at 64 (examining
the ethical dilemma created by permitting criminals to profit from the sales of their
stories).
19. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724
F. Supp. 170, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Nicholas C. Katsoris, "Son of Sam"
Terrorizes Publishing Industry, 9 ENr. & SPoRTs LAWYER 13 (Summer 1991);
Criminals Revenues from Stories Curbed, N.Y. Tzs, Aug. 13, 1977, at 28 (Sen.
Emanuel R. Gold developed the law after reading a newspaper article that stated
that the killer 'stood to get rich' and that there would be people 'waiting at the
precinct house to get him to sign a contract.' ").
20. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. Laws of 1977,
ch. 823, reprinted in, McKinney's 1977 Session Laws of New York at 1321-22.
Ironically, the law enacted to prevent the Son of Sam from profiting from his atroci-
ties and which is commonly referred to by his alias never applied to him because
David Berkowitz was found incompetent to stand trial, and the statute at that time
applied only to convicted criminals. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (citation omitted). McGraw-Hill
purchased the rights to Berkowitz's story in an agreement that included, "a
$250,000 advance, $150,000 profit to the ghost writer, and $75,000 to Berkowitz
through his court-appointed conservator, Doris Johnsen." See Okuda, supra note 4,
at 1354. However, at Berkowitz's request, his royalties in the amount of
$118,443.36 from the book Son of Sam, were distributed, in accordance with a
settlement agreement, to twelve of his victims or their estates. Brief for Respondents
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response to the lucrative offers that would be available to the "Son
of Sam."2 1 Senator Emanuel R. Gold, the author of the bill, indi-
cated his rationale in proposing it:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an indi-
vidual, such as the forty-four calibre killer, can expect to receive
large sums of money for his story once he is captured while five
people are dead, other people were injured as a result of his con-
duct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal situations,
the victim must be more important than the criminal."2
The Legislature's justification for the law was to ensure that moneys
received by criminals who publicize their crimes first be made avail-
able to their victims.23 The statute strengthened New York's existing
legislative efforts to assist crime victims.2 4
at 8 n.13, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 504 (1991) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
21. "It is no secret that section 632-a was enacted in hasty response to the pub-
lic outcry that ensued after the David Berkowitz sale was publicized." Simon &
Schuster, Inc., v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) citing, In re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
22. Memorandum of Senator Gold, 1977 N.Y. State Legis. Ann. 267.
23. The legislature's justification for the statute was stated as follows:
Currently a person may commit a crime causing much damage and per-
sonal injury, and then gain substantial financial benefits related to result-
ing publicity. This bill will ensure that monies received by the criminal
under such circumstances shall first be made available to recompense the
victims of that crime for their loss and suffering. The Requirement of a
civil action will prevent the abuse of this privilege.
Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A9019 (July 15, 1977), reprinted in Legis. Bill
Jacket 1977 N.Y. Laws 823. The Division of Criminal Justice Services also sup-
ported the bill in a letter to the Governor's counsel:
Though hardly a new phenomenon, there has been a recent realization by
the general public that where a defendant is a well-known personality or
the crime with which he is charged is one that has aroused a high degree
of public interest, he is in a position to make a considerable amount from
articles, books or television accounts of his life, times and crimes.... [Tihe
bill takes cognizance of the situation and seeks to redirect the money flow
from the criminal to his victims. As an expression of the concept of simple
justice it cannot be faulted. It is merely another facet of the oft-repeated
maxim that crime does not (or should not) pay.
Memorandum from Robert Schlanger, Division of Criminal Justice Services (Aug.
3, 1977), reprinted in Legis. Bill Jacket N.Y. Laws 823. But see In re Johnsen, 430
N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1979) ("[632-a was] conceived in haste, written in
haste, and declared under the cry of the public for the Legislature to exact retribu-
tion ...").
24. In 1966, the New York Legislature in recognition that crime victims and
their dependents often suffer devastating injuries and insurmountable debts en-
acted Article 223 of the Executive Law. See Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petrome-
lis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 1991). The statute established a general victims
compensation scheme which sought to secure compensation for victims and their
families regardless of whether the perpetrator was ever apprehended. See N.Y.
1992]
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C. The Operation of N.Y. Exec. Law Section 632-a
Executive Law section 632-a was either the inspiration or model
for in excess of forty state statutes25 and a federal statute 26 which
also seek to compensate the victims of notorious criminals who at-
tempt to profit from the exploitation of their crime stories.2 7  The
statute required that "any legal entity" contracting with an accused
or convicted person for work amounting to a "reenactment" of his
crime "by way of movie, book, magazine article, tape recording,
phonograph record, radio or television presentation, [or] live en-
tertainment of any kind" or a recollection of his "thoughts, feelings,
opinions or emotions regarding such crime," to submit the contract
to the Crime Victims Board.2 8 Upon a determination that the con-
ExEc. LAw §§ 620-634 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The statute's official state-
ment of purpose is set out in its "[d]eclaration of policy and legislative intent':
The Legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal
physical injury or death as a result of criminal acts. Such persons or their
dependents may thereby suffer disability, incur financial hardships or be-
come dependent upon public assistance. The legislature finds and deter-
mines that there is a need for government financial assistance for such
victims of crime. Accordingly, it is the legislature's intent that aid, care
and support be provided by the state, as a matter of grace, for such victims
of crime.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 620 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
25. See Ecker & O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1075 n.6.
26. Special Forfeiture of Collateral Profits of Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-82
(1988). But see Goldberg, supra note 4, at 698 n.57 (Congress specifically re-
jected a statute modeled after the New York statute.). For a detailed discussion of
the operation and uniqueness of the federal statute see Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curie, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 89-9192) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
Criminals whose profits the Victims Board sought to escrow included: Jean Harris,
the convicted killer of "Scarsdale Diet" Doctor Herman Tarnower; Mark David
Chapman, the convicted killer of ex-Beatle John Lennon; and R. Foster Winans, the
former Wall Street Journal columnist convicted of insider trading. See Simon &
Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
27. See Loss, supra note 4, at 1334. For a comparison of the specific provisions
of the New York statute with various other state statutes see id. notes 13-32 and
accompanying text.
28. N.Y. Exsc. Law § 632.a(1) (McKinney 1982) states in the most pertinent part:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal en-
tity contracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any
person, accused or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the
reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article,
tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live
entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such accused or con-
victed persons thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such
crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board and pay over to
the board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such contract,
be owing to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives.
The board shall deposit such moneys in an escrow account for the benefit
of and payable to any victim or the legal representative of any victim of
Son of Sam
tract was subject to the statute, the legal entity was required to turn
over all moneys owed the criminal under the contract.29 The board
would then deposit the money in an escrow account.3 0 Before a vic-
tim or his family could receive payments from the account, they
would have to obtain a civil judgment against the criminal within
five years of the creation of the escrow account.3 Also, victims
could not gain access to the funds unless the criminal figure came
under the definition of "convicted person" as established by the
statute.32 The statute created a mechanism that significantly in-
creased the chances of recovery for this unique class of victims.
Section 632-a(9) nufified any attempts by the accused or con-
victed to shield media money through devices such as the "execu-
tion of a power of attorney."3 3 Such actions were declared against
the "public policy" of the state.3 4 Section 632-a(7) expanded the
statute of limitations on recovery for this class of victims by not be-
ginning the running of the five-year period until an escrow account
had been established s.3  This extension was a substantial advantage
over the statute of limitations on a typical recovery, which is only
three years long and begins at the time of the injury.3 6
Sections 632-a(5) and (1O)(b) further increased the victims likeli-
hood of recovery by expanding the definition of a convicted per-
son.3 7 Section 632-a designated persons found not guilty as a result
of a mental defect or those found incompetent to stand trial as con-
victed and their publication money subject to the statute.3" Section
632-a(10)(b) included persons who "voluntarily and intelligently
admitted the commission of a crime" within the definition.
The distribution of funds from the escrow account was subject to a
five level priority scheme under section 632-a(11).39 First, the crim-
inal was able to obtain payment of up to twenty percent of the mon-
eys in the escrow account for the purpose of retaining legal
crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by such-accused
person, but only if such accused person is eventually convicted of the
crime and provided that such victim, within five years of the date of the
establishment of such escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judgment for damages





33. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(9) (McKinney 1982).
34. See id.
35. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(7) (McKinney 1982).
36. See N.Y. Civ. PlJc. L. & R. 214(5), 215(3), & 215(8) (McKinney 1990).
37. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(S) & (10)(b) (McKinney 1982).
38. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (11)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
39. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(11) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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representation at any stage of his criminal proceedings.40 Also, a
representative of the criminal was entitled to be paid his expenses in
producing the work.4 1 Second, the Victims Board was able to re-
ceive reimbursement, not to exceed fifty percent of any civil judg-
ment obtained by a victim, for previous awards made to crime
victims or their families. 42 Third, victims could satisfy any money
judgment they earned.43 Fourth, other judgment creditors of the
criminal, including tax authorities, were entitled to any remaining
moneys.4 4 Finally, after five years or a showing that all pending ac-
tions are completed, the convicted or accused person was entitled to
any funds in the account.45 Section 632-a was not complete in its
coverage of criminals' publication contracts as it did not apply to
46victimless crimes. Also, the statute provided for judicial review of
the decisions of the Victims Board.47 Under section 632-a(12), any
party objecting to the final determination and order of the Board
was free to seek judicial relief under article seventy-eight of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Making of Wiseguy
In 1981, Richard E. Snyder and Michael Korda-respectively, the
president and the editor-in-chief of Simon & Schuster-conceived
the idea of publishing a book about Henry Hill, a foot-soldier in the
Luccese crime family.48 At the time, Hill was assisting state and fed-
eral prosecutors under the Federal Witness Protection Program.4 9
The career criminal had been arrested in 1980 and charged with six
counts of conspiracy to sell drugs.5 0 In return for testifying against
40. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(8) (McKinney 1982).
41. Id.
42. N.Y. Exzc. LAw § 632-a(11)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
43. N.Y. Exzc. LAw § 632-a(11)(c) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
44. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(11)(d) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
45. N.Y. Exzc. LAw § 632-a(l1)(e) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
46. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1991),
vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
47. N.Y. ExEC. LAw § 632-a(12) (McKinney 1982).
48. Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No.
90-1059) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. The purpose of the book was to shatter
the romantic image of organized crime and present a more realistic picture. See
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1990). Brief for
Appellant Simon & Schuster, Inc. at 8, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d
777 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9192) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
49. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779. Among the crimes that the law enforce-
ment agencies were investigating was the six million dollar Lufthansa Airlines rob-
bery at Kennedy International Airport. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 11.
50. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506. The crimes that Hill participated
in included bribery, assault, extortion, theft, burglary, arson, drug dealing, credit
card fraud and murder. See Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779.
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his mafia former employers, he received immunity and a new
identity.51
In searching for an author, Simon & Schuster consulted Sterling
Lord, a prominent New York literary agent.S2 Lord contacted
Nicholas Pileggi, a recognized crime writer.5 3 On August 21, 1981,
Lord, Hill and Pileggi entered into an agreement which covered the
division of payments to be received from the publisher.5 4 On Sep-
tember 1, 1981, Simon & Schuster, Pileggi and Hill signed a pub-
lishing agreement by which the latter two sold exclusive rights to an
autobiographical non-fiction works s about organized crime in New
York City.5 6 Sterling Lord received ten percent of the moneys paid
to Pileggi and Hill.5 7
For more than two years, Pileggi and Hill undertook an extensive
collaboration." The two spent over three hundred hours together
on the project.5 9 During that period, Hill provided in-depth infor-
mation on his career in organized crime;60 this information formed
the basis of Wiseguy: Life in A Mafia Family.6 1
In January 1986, publication of Wiseguy brought immediate suc-
cess and acclaim.6 2 Wiseguy was praised for its deglamorizing of
organized crime.6 3 New York Daily News columnist Jimmy Breslin,
called it "the best book on crime in America ever written." 64 Pro-
fessor G. Robert Blakey, draftsman of the RICO statute, "highly rec-
51. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506.
52. Id.
53. Pileggi had previously written a similiar book on a private detective, and
articles on crime families for The New York Times Magazine, New York Magazine
and Reader's Digest. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 48, at 8.
54. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779. The agreement provided that monies
received from Simon & Schuster were to be divided between Hill and Pileggi. See
Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 172. According to the agreement, Hill could
receive all his payments only if the manuscript was delivered on time and to the
satisfaction of the publisher. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 12.
55. The contract denominated the work as an "Untitled Autobiographical Non-
Fiction about the Mafia." Brief for the Respondents, supra note 20, at 11.
56. The Court of Appeals recognized that "[tihere seems to be no question that
Hill would not have agreed to participate in the project without the assurance he
would be paid." Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779.
57. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 172.
58. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 7. According to Simon & Schuster,
Pileggi and Hill collaborated on "a virtually daily basis." Id. Pileggi's notes of his
conversations with Hill "occup[ied] more than six linear feet of files." Id.
59. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779.
60. See id.
61. N. Puzom, WsEouY: Lmm n; A MmA F im, y (1985).
62. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501, 507 (1991). For a sampling of the extremely favorable reviews of
Wiseguy see id.; Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779. See also Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 48, at 7.
63. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
64. Id.
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ommended" it.65
Wiseguy, "primarily in Hill's first-person narrative," described in
detail the daily existence of organized crime. 66 In reviewing his
twenty-five year criminal career, Hill admitted to participation in a
variety of offenses, including involvement in the Boston College
basketball point-shaving scandal and the 1978 theft of $6 million
from the Lufthansa terminal at Kennedy airport, the largest success-
ful cash robbery in American history.6 7 Wiseguy also revealed the
identity of many of Hill's victims.6 8 Within a year, over a million
copies were in print.6 9 Furthermore, Wiseguy became the basis for
the equally successful motion picture Goodfellas7 ° by Martin
65. G. Robert Blakey, The Lawyer's Bookshelf, N.Y. L.., Apr. 15, 1988, at 2. In
his praise of Wiseguy Professor Blakey noted:
Pileggi, fortunately, had the cooperation of Hill and his wife, Karen, so his
story reflects a substantial amount of insight into the personalities of the
protagonist .... Wiseguy is... a welcome addition to the popular litera-
ture on organized crime, and, fortunately, it does not unnecessarily con-
tribute to the sensationalism, glamorizing or romanticizing of organized
crime or the mob. Id.
66. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506. In Wiseguy, Hill reflected: "[Alt the
age of twelve my ambition was to be a gangster. To be a wiseguy. To me being a
wiseguy was better than being president of the United States." Id. (quoting N.
PTT, oGI, WMEoUY: Lnu ; A MAm FmuLY 19 (1985)).
67. In its recent decision the Supreme Court highlighted Hill's reflections on his
prison term for an extortion conviction, and the preferred treatment that members
of the mafia received:
The dorm was a separate three.story building outside the wall, which
looked more like a Holiday Inn than a prison. There were four guys to a
room, and we had comfortable beds and private baths. There were two
dozen rooms on each floor, and each of them had mob guys living in them.
It was like a wiseguy convention-the whole Gotti crew, Jimmy Doyle and
his guys, "Ernie Boy" Abbamonte and "Joe Crow" Delvecchio, Vinnie
Aloi, Frank Cotroni ....
We had the best food smuggled into our dorm from the kitchen. Steaks,
veal cutlets, shrimp, red snapper. Whatever the hacks could buy, we ate.
It cost me two, three hundred a week. Guys like Paulie spent five hundred
to a thousand bucks a week. Scotch cost thirty dollars a pint. The hacks
used to bring it inside the walls in their lunch pails. We never ran out of
booze, because we had six hacks bringing it in six days a week. Depend-
ing on what you wanted and how much you were willing to spend, life
could be almost bearable.
Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506, 507 (quoting N. Puzooi, WIsEouY: Lum m A
MAFIAn,Y 150-51 (1985)).
68. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779. At least one of Hill's victim's heirs ex-
pressed an intent to make a claim against the escrow account. See Brief for Re-
spondents, supra note 20, at 18. After reading Wiseguy, Patricia Eisenberg, wife of
William Bentvana a/k/a Billy Batts, discovered that her husband who had disap-
peared fifteen years earlier, had been murdered and that Hill had been an acces-
sory. Id.
69. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 779.
70. GooDFELLs (Warner Bros. 1990).
Scorsese.71
On January 31, 1986, the New York State Crime Victims Board
wrote to Simon & Schuster: "It has come to our attention that you
may have contracted with a person accused or convicted of a crime
for the payment of monies to such person."'7 2 The counsel directed
the publishing company to provide the Victims Board with copies of
contracts it entered into with Henry Hill,73 and to freeze all pay-
ments to Sterling Lord on behalf of Hill.74 In response to the
Board's directive,75 Simon & Schuster, on May 22, 1986, furnished
the Board with the relevant documents. 76 Simon & Schuster also in-
formed the Board that it had paid Hill $96,250 via the Sterling Lord
Agency and would suspend the $27,958 due him." On May 21,
1987, the Board issued a Proposed Determination and Order in
which it concluded that the contract, "is of the type regulated by
Executive Law § 632-a."17 8 The Board further determined that a
copy of the publishing contract should have been submitted to the
Board at the time of its execution in 1981. The Board found that
Wiseguy contained "thoughts, feelings, opinions and emotions re-
garding crimes committed by Hill as well as his admission to in-
volvement in such crimes."179 The Board also found that Hill had to
pay to the Board all profits he had received and that Simon &
Schuster was responsible for turning over all monies it had "wrong-
fully distributed" to him, in the event Hill failed to tender his prof-
71. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501, 506 (1991).
The screenplay for Goodiellas was an adaptation of Wiseguy. See MPAA Brief,
supra note 13, at 21. Furthermore, Warner Bros. retained Henry Hill as a consult-
ant and Robert De Niro, the leading actor in the film conferred with him regularly.
See id. at 22. Also, Nicholas Pileggi and Hill held the film rights, which Warner
Bros. acquired for an estimated $550,000. See id. at 21-22. Goodfellas' awards
include being chosen best film of 1990 by the Los Angeles Film Critics Associa-
tion, the New York Film Critics Circle, the National Society of Film Critics, the
Chicago Film Critics and being nominated as best film by the Academy of Motion
Picture Arts and Sciences. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 8 n.8. See also
sources cited supra note 4.
72. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
73. But see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 8. The New York State Crime
Victims Board began its inquiry by requesting all contracts that either Simon &
Schuster or Nicholas Pileggi may have entered into with any person accused or
convicted of a crime. Id. The sweeping demand forced the publisher to review
thousands of contracts. Id. Contra Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 12 n.19.
74. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 780.
75. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 12. Simon & Schuster's compli-
ance with the Board's request was in response to a subpoena issued by the Board.
Id.
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its.s" The monies were to be placed in an escrow account for the
benefit of the victims of Hill's crimes.81
On July 15, 1987, the Board's Order became final as Simon &
Schuster opted not to object s 2 to the Board's decision and did not
request a fact-finding hearing available to it.83 Instead, the pub-
lisher brought suit on August 3, 1987.84
B. The Procedural History
1. The District Court Decision
Simon & Schuster sought an order from the Southern District of
New York declaring section 632-a unconstitutional under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments."' The publisher claimed that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional on its face as applied in this case and asked
for an injunction preventing its application.8 6
On October 26, 1989, Judge John F. Keenan granted the Victims
Board's cross-motion for summary judgment and declared New York
Executive Law section 632-a constitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments." Regarding the statute as only a "procedural
80. The Board directed Henry Hill to turn over all monies received, plus inter-
est, less commissions paid to the Sterling Lord Agency. Simon & Schuster, in addi-
tion to being responsible if Hill did not comply, was ordered to turn over the
$27,958 then due Hill as well as any future royalties. Id. The Board, however,
determined that payments made to Nicholas Pileggi, the author, were not subject to
section 632-a. Id.
81. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
82. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 780. However, Sterling Lord, Hill's literary
agent, did object to the Board's Proposed Determination and Order which required
it to turn over any monies received as Hill's representative. Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 172 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777,
780 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). On October 19, 1988, the Victims
Board issued its Final Determination, regarding the Sterling Lord Agency; it con-
cluded that the literary agent could retain its ten percent fee pursuant to N.Y. Exec.
Law section 632-a(8). See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 13.
83. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 780.
84. Id.
85. See generally Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
86. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 14. Simon & Schuster also sought
an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Simon &
Schuster specifically alleged that "[tjhe Board's enforcement of Section 632-a
against publishers, including [Simon & Schuster], interferes with the publication of
biographies, autobiographies and other works of non-fiction on some of the most
pressing social issues of the day by effectively prohibiting the compensation of a
class of authors, sources, and literary agents." Brief for Defendants-Appellees at
13, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9192)
(hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
87. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 180. But see Brief for Appellant, supra
note 48, at 19 (claiming that the district court erred, under the standards of Fed. B.
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hurdle," the court held that section 632-a did not restrict expressive
activity.88 The court determined that although section 632-a ap-
plies where speech and nonspeech elements are combined, the law
was aimed at regulating the profits of the contracts-a nonspeech
element-and did not have a direct effect on expressive activity.8 9
The court concluded that any burden caused by the temporary di-
version of a criminal's proceeds to guarantee the compensation of
victims, was "merely incidental" to the speech element involved.9"
The court decided that the O'Brien 9 1 test for incidental limitations
on First Amendment rights was the appropriate standard of re-
view.9 2 The O'Brien test has four requirements: (1) that the govern-
mental regulation be enacted within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) that the regulation further an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; (3) that the governmental interest be un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and (4) that the
incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.9 3 First,
the district court found that the New York State Legislature acted
within its authority.9 4 Second, both parties agreed that compensat-
ing crime victims was an important governmental interest.95 Third,
in determining that the interest was unrelated to the suppression of
speech, the court emphasized that the statute merely attached the
proceeds from speech and that it involved a "purely objective in-
quiry" without any evaluation of the expressions of criminal speak-
ers. 96 Finally, the court held that any incidental burden on first
amendment freedoms was not greater than was essential for the gov-
ernment's interest in compensating victims-section 632-a was not
drawn to ban speech, but "to garnish the proceeds so that they will
be used in a productive manner."97 The district court also rejected
Simon & Schuster's claim that section 632-a violated due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment; the court found this claim to be
Civ. P. 56, by disregarding undisputed affidavits that the statute deters
publications).
88. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 176-77.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. Simon &Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 178. See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 407 (1989) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
("where speech and nonspeech are combined in the same course of conduct a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on the First Amendment freedoms")).
93. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
94. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 178.
95. Id. at 178-79.
96. Id. at 178.
97. Id. at 179.
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overbroad and vague.9"
Finally, Judge Keenan, while observing that freedom of speech
"presupposes a willing speaker," 99 stressed that "although it may be
more difficult for publishers and authors to create books with the
cooperation of a criminal, it is not impossible nor is such coopera-
tion proscribed by section 632-a." 00
2. The Circuit Court Decision
On October 3, 1990, a divided panel of the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's judgment, but not its reasoning.10 1 The
court unanimously agreed that Executive Law section 632-a im-
posed a direct burden on first amendment freedoms and was a con-
tent-based restriction on speech, thus requiring the application of a
"strict scrutiny" standard.10 2
The majority, consisting of Judges Roger I. Miner and John W.
Walker, Jr., further justified its imposition of the more demanding
test by pointing out that the statute "serves to single out the media
98. Id. at 179-80. Simon & Schuster did not advance the overbreadth and
vagueness arguments on appeal. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777,
781 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). For a discussion on the vagueness
of Son of Sam laws, see Okuda, supra note 4, at 1370-71; Ecker & O'Brien, supra
note 4, at 1081 n.32. For a discussion of procedural due process problems raised
by Son of Sam laws see Cartwright, supra note 4, at 848-50; Ecker & O'Brien, supra
note 4, at 1081 n.32.
99. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 176 (quoting Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)).
100. Id. at 176. In reaching his decision, Judge Keenan cited Arcara v. Cloud
Books Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), to demonstrate how section 632-a is directed at
nonexpressive activity and not expressive activity. Id. at 177. Judge Keenan distin-
guished the case at bar from Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), in which the
Supreme Court held a Colorado statute unconstitutional. The statute prohibited
compensation of individuals circulating petitions to qualify ballot initiatives for
state elections. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because it directly re-
stricted political speech. Judge Keenan noted that while the statute in Meyer
"abridged the right to engage in political speech which is at the 'core' of the First
Amendment," section 632-a "has no abridging effect on political speech; it merely
functions to prevent criminals from capitalizing on their crimes." Id.
101. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g
724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). The court of ap-
peals also disagreed with the district court's distinguishing of Meyer; it wrote: "[a]
distinction based upon political advocacy does not seem to us to be a valid one." It
further stated: "[P]rotected expression comes in many forms other than ideological
or political speech." Id. at 782.
102. Id. at 784. The court stressed that "the denial of payment for expressive
activity constitutes a direct burden on that activity." Id. at 781 (citing Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988)). It conceded that, "[w]ithout a financial in-
centive to relate their criminal activities, most would-be storytellers will decline to
speak or write." Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 781. The court also noted that
Meyer applied "exacting scrutiny." Id. at 781-82.
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for differential treatment," and that such treatment resulted in "ex-
cluding from circulation the expression of criminals who would
write about their crimes if the price were right."103
The strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review requires that
the state satisfy two requirements: (1) that its regulation serves a
compelling state interest; and (2) that the legislation is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its purpose.""' Based largely' on section 632-a's
legislative history,"'5 the court of appeals found that New York had
a compelling interest in "assuring that a criminal not profit from the
exploitation of his or her crime while the victims of that crime are in
need of compensation by reason of their victimization." 10 6 Writing
for the majority Judge Miner emphasized that the purpose of the stat-
ute is "not to suppress speech" but to assure victim compensa-
tion.' 0 7 The court concluded that section 632-a was "narrowly
tailored"' 08 to the state's interest because, "[i]t provides a special-
ized form of attachment and is designed to freeze the proceeds of
storytelling by criminals" for the benefit of their victims.1 0 9
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jon 0. Newman refused to join in
an opinion that found that a content-based, restrictive statute passed
"strict scrutiny." 0 Judge Newman observed that the majority justi-
fied upholding the New York statute on the theory that "escrowing
this narrow category of payments benefits crime victims, an objec-
tive New York is anxious to achieve .... . He contended, how-
103. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 782.
104. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (content-based regulation must meet strict scrutiny to survive); Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-31 (1987) (differential treat-
ment must survive "strict scrutiny")).
105. See Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 782-83 (citing Assembly Bill Memoran-
dum Re: A9019 (July 15, 1977), reprinted in Legis. Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y. Laws
823, and Memorandum from Robert Schlanger, Division of Criminal Justice Serv-
ices, to Judah Gribetz (Aug. 3, 1977), reprinted in Legis. Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y.
Laws 823).
106. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 782-83.
107. Id. at 783.
108. In holding the statute to be "narrowly tailored," the court rejected Simon &
Schuster's claim that section 632-a was underinclusive and overinclusive. See id.
at 784.
109. Id. at 783. In the court's opinion the statute recognized that, "[t]he sole asset
of most criminals is the right to tell the story of their crimes." Id. at 783. But see id.
at 785-86 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven if it were true that the sole asset of most
criminals is the right to tell the story of their crime, that observation would not
validate New York's content-based regulation of speech.").
110. Judge Newman drew on the case of Jean Harris's autobiography, Stranger in
Two Worlds, to illustrate the content-based nature of section 632-a. See id. at 785.
The Victims Board had determined that the statute applied to her book because two
chapters referred to her crime, but had those chapters been eliminated her royal-
ties would not have been escrowed. Id.
111. Id.
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ever, that such justification "eliminates the entire inquiry concerning
the validity of content-based discriminations."' 11 2 Further, he ar-
gued that section 632-a, a content-based discrimination, did not
meet the "narrowly tailored" element of the strict scrutiny test be-
cause the state's interest could be achieved by a reasonable alterna-
tive. s1 3 Judge Newman suggested that if New York's attachment
laws were too limited, then what the First Amendment required was
a broadening of remedies. 114 Also, he noted that the statute had a
pronounced "chilling effect" on the publication of valuable writings
about activities of high public interest." 5 Judge Newman's in-
sightful opinion foreshadowed what was in store for New York's Son
of Sam law. 1 r'
C. Arguments before the Supreme Court
On February 19, 1991, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New
York State Crime Victims Board. 1 7 In this case the established first
amendment theory that content-based restrictions on speech are
presumptively invalid"18 clashed with the fundamental legal con-
cept that criminals should not profit from their crimes."'
112. Id.
113. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 786. Judge Newman considered the major-
ity's conclusion that section 632-a was "narrowly tailored" to be "circular" reason-
ing because it defined the state's interest in terms of the statute's scope and thereby
held the statute to be precisely tailored to the interest. Id. at 785. The Supreme
Court adopted Judge Newman's analysis. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511
(citing Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting)).
114. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 785-86. Judge Newman suggested that a
statute that did not single out payments for speech could pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 785 ("New York is entitled to escrow for the benefit of crime victims all
payments to criminals.") (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 784. Judge Newman was concerned that holding publishers retroac-
tively liable for payments later found to be subject to section 632-a, would result in
their either not publishing or "purg[ing] manuscripts." Id. at 786-87.
116. The dissent demonstrated one of the weaknesses of the statute by pointing
out that in the first eleven years of its existence it had produced only five escrow
accounts, three of which involved the same criminal. See id. at 787.
117. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 111 S. Ct.
950, rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
118. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S.- - (1991) (slip op., at 6-7). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Bestricions, 54 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 46, 48 (1987).
119. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). In Justice Cardozo's
explanation of the reasoning underlying Riggs, he described the roots of the princi-
ple that no man should profit from his own wrong as, "deeply fastened in universal
sentiments of justice ...." See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 2 (quoting B.
CARDozo, Tam NATuRE OF THE JuDicA PRoczss 40-41 (1921)).
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1. The Petitioner and Amici 120
a. New York's "Son of Sam" law should be subject to strict
scrutiny
Simon & Schuster asserted that any law that directly burdens
speech,12 1 that is a content- or speaker-based regulation, 122 or that
singles out the media for adversely differential treatment 123 so im-
pairs speech that it is presumptively invalid. 2' Under Meyer v.
Grant 125 such laws are subject to "strict scrutiny" and pass constitu-
tional muster only if the government proves that the law serves a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.1 2 6
i. Section 6 3 2 -a's payment restriction deters the publication of
protected speech
The Court in Meyer determined that statutory restrictions on ex-
penditures for speech have the "inevitable effect of reducing the
total quantum of speech." ' 7 In Meyer the Supreme Court unani-
mously struck down a Colorado statute that prohibited paying peo-
ple to circulate initiative petitions.12 8 It held the law to be a direct
120. On October 15, the Court heard oral argument. Simon & Schuster was
represented by Ronald S. Rauchberg (Counsel of Record) and Charles S. Sims of
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn and Mark C. Morril of Simon & Schuster, Inc.
Amicus Curiae briefs in support of the petitioner were filed by the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Association of American Publishers Inc., and the Motion
Picture Association of America. See Deborah Pines, Son-of-Sam Law Clallenge
Argued Before High Court, N.Y. L.I., Oct. 16, 1991, at 1, 2.
121. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 16 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 64, 66 (1976); Arcara v. Cloud Book, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986)).
122. See id. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
123. See id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribute Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983)).
124. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. -, - (1991) (slip op., at 6-7)).
125. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
126. See id. at 420 (Meyer "exacting scrutiny" is commonly known as "strict
scrutiny"). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 15-16. Below, Simon &
Schuster emphasized that subjecting a law to strict scrutiny "almost always presages
invalidation." Brief for Appellant, supra note 48, at 20; see also Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 1-5, Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (counter argument to the Board's contention
that Strict Scrutiny is not the appropriate standard of review) [hereinafter Reply
Brief for Petitioner].
127. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 17-18 (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at
423). Petitioner noted that the court has held on seven separate occasions in the
last fifteen years that restrictions on payments for speech are invalid unless they
survive strict scrutiny. See id. at 17, 18 n.15.
128. Id. at 18 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428).
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burden on the initiative proponents' first amendment rights. 129
Describing the burden on speech as "well-nigh" impossible to jus-
tify, the Court struck down the law.13 0
Petitioner Simon & Schuster argued that section 632-a was like
the statute in Meyer: It was a prohibition on making payments nec-
essary for speech; it had resulted in the elimination of some speech;
and thus, it should likewise be struck down under strict scrutiny
review. 1
3 1
ii. Section 632-a differentially regulates expressive activity
Simon & Schuster argued that under the rule of Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,132 a statute
that "singles out the press" requires "a heavier burden of justifica-
tion on the State" than does a generally applicable economic regu-
lation; and further, such a statute is invalid unless "the State asserts a
counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot
achieve without differential" regulation.13 3 Simon & Schuster main-
tained that under this rule section 632-a is subject to strict scru-
tiny.13 4 It pointed out that section 632-a singles out expressive
activity in precisely the way Minneapolis Star and its progeny13 5
have condemned, because it applied only to those contracting to
publish or create expression.'13  Simon & Schuster further con-
tended that the statute deprives only those engaged in expressive
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423, 425.) See also Riley v. National Fed'n of
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 793-94 (1988) (speaker's uncertainty about payment
"must necessarily chill speech in direct contravention of the First Amendment's
dictates").
131. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 59, at 18-19. Simon & Schuster
stressed that "the incentive of economic gain is the engine that drives free expres-
sion." Id. at 20 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The publisher also reminded the
Court of its observation that "[B]eing free to engage in... expression subject to a
ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often
on a single tank of gasoline ... ." Id. at 20-21 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
19 n.18).
132. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983). For a further discussion of Minneapolis Star see Brief for Appellant,
supra note 126, at 31-34.
133. Id.
134. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 48, at 21. See also-Reply Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 126, at 5-6 (criticizing Board's contention that differential
treatment requires strict scrutiny only if it is directed at suppressing particular
ideas).
135. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991); Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697
(1986).
136. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 22.
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activity from receiving payments and subjects only the media's con-
tracts to inspection.1 3 7
iii. Section 632-a's restrictions are content-based
The petitioner noted that under Texas v. Johnson,13 8 any content-
based regulation of expression was subject to strict scrutiny.1s9 Si-
mon & Schuster asserted that the application of section 632-a de-
pended specifically on the content of the speech.140 Simon &
Schuster emphasized the Court's consistent holdings14 1 that regula-
tions on speech that are content- or speaker-based pose special dan-
gers to free speech and that such regulations demand "the most
exacting scrutiny. 14 2
Previously, the Victims Board had argued that under City of Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theafres, Inc.,143 strict scrutiny is inappropriate be-
cause section 632-a is "justified without reference to the conteni of
the regulated speech." 144 In response, Simon & Schuster pointed
out that this was inconsistent with Respondent's repeated justifica-
tion of section 632-a which stressed the nature of the speech that the
statute affected. Simon & Schuster emphasized the inapplicability of
Renton 145 to direct regulations of speech.146 Simon & Schuster
137. Id. at 22. Simon & Schuster argued that section 632-a's exhaustive listing of
all of the expressive media to which the statute applies, including every "movie,
book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph recording, radio or television
presentation, [and] live entertainment," was targeting the media.
138. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (anti-flag burning statute held unconstitutional).
139. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 48, at 22.
140. See id. at 22 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412). For a counter-argu-
ment to respondents contention that section 632-a is not content based see Reply
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 126, at 6. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Civil Liberties Union, New York Civil Liberties Union, and PEN Ameri-
can Center, in Support of Petitioner at 12-14, Simon & Schuster v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) [hereinafter
ACLU Brief].
141. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 23 n.19 (citing Leathers v.
Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct.
2404, 2409 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406; Arkansas Writers' Project v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 222 (1987); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
784-85 (1978); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. 364, 384 (1984); Be-
gan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461-64 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
537 (1980); Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99(1972); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 26 (1989) (White, J.,
concurring)).
142. See id.
143. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
144. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 86, at 54-55. The Board would also
advance this argument before the Supreme Court, and Simon & Schuster would
again address it. Compare Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 37-39 wit Re-
ply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 126, at 7-8.
145. For a discussion of the background and application of Benton, see Com-
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highlighted the Board's justification of section 632-a as necessary
because the depiction of the crime in the press causes a "second" or
"additional" harm or violation to victims or their families.1 47 The
publisher contended that Senator Gold's comment in sponsoring the
statute, "i]t is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that
an individual, such as [Son of Sam], can expect to receive large
sums of money for his story,"'1 4 ' along with the other justifications
for the statute demonstrated that it was hostile to the speech it regu-
lated and, therefore, was not content-neutral. 14 9 It further argued
that the Renton l' standard should not apply because that decision
had never been determinative and because it had never applied to
regulations that restricted speech on their faces nor to regulations
that gave differential treatment of speech.' 5 '
iv. United States v. O'Brien 15 2 is inapplicable
Simon & Schuster contended that an O'Brien analysis is inappro-
priate where a statute regulates expression "on its face."'l 3 It as-
serted that O'Brien is correctly applied where a regulation is aimed
at a broad range of behavior and affects speech only inciden-
tally.154 According to Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court in Ar-
cara v. Cloud Books, Inc. "s observed that the first inquiry under the
O'Brien test was whether the statute on its face regulated speech or
an activity that was "necessarily expressive" and that Minneapolis
ment, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis after Renton, 102 HARv. L.
Rzv. 1904 (1989).
146. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 24.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added by petitioner).
149. Id. at 25. Simon & Schuster emphasized that "justifications for regulation
[must] have nothing to do with content," for it to be considered content-neutral. Id.
(citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)).
150. Renton involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult
theaters from locating in certain areas. See City of Benton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1985). Classifying the ordinance as a time, place, and man-
ner regulation, the Court held that it was aimed not at the content of the films, but at
the "secondary effects" of the theaters on the community. Id. at 46-47. In rejecting
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of O'Brien, which was that if "a motivating factor"
for the ordinance was to restrict first amendment rights, then it was invalid; the
Court emphasized that, "[ilt is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an
alleged illicit legislative motive." Id. at 47-48. It found the ordinance to pass mus-
ter, under an intermediate level test, holding that it served a substantial government
interest and allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Id. at
50-52.
151. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 25. See also Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 126, at 7-8.
152. 391 U.S. 367 (1965)(draft card burning case).
153. Id. at 26 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375).
154. See id.
155. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
Star, not O'Brien, applied to a statute that singled out speech."' 8
Simon & Schuster argued that the application of section 632-a could
not be considered an incidental burden on speech because the only
function of the statute was to prohibit payments for certain dnds of
speech.1 -7 Further, Simon & Schuster pointed out that the Court in
Buckley v. Valeo 1-s held that restrictions on payment for speech are
not "comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in
O'Brien."159 Additionally, the publisher stressed that O'Brien was
inapplicable to content-based regulations. 16 0
The State interest furthered by section 6 3 2 -a was to compensate
victims for alleged additional harm caused by the media's depiction
of the crime. Simon & Schuster contended that that interest was re-
lated to the suppression of first amendment rights and therefore was
completely outside the O'Brien test. 16
b. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a does not survive review under
strict scrutiny
Petitioner Simon & Schuster noted that the First Amendment's di-
rection that "no law" shall abridge free speech is so powerful that
the Court has at times rejected the power of government to regulate
expression based on its content. 162 For example, in Police Depart-
ment of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,161 the Court observed that
"government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 164 Simon &
Schuster emphasized that the holding of the Second Circuit below
ignored how unusual, if not unprecedented, it was for a statute to
survive review under strict scrutiny.165 In fact, the Court in Bernal
v. Feiner6 6 stated, "strict-scrutiny review is 'strict' in theory but usu-
ally 'fatal' in fact."'16 7 Additionally, in Meyer v. Grant,168 the Court
156. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 26.
157. See id.
158. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
159. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 26 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 16).
160. Id. at 27 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 295 (1984)).
161. See id.
162. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 126, at 9.
163. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
164. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 126, at 9.
165. Id.
166. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
167. Id. at 219 n.6.
168. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
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recently labeled "strict scrutiny" a "well-nigh insurmountable"
test.
169
c. The statute is not necessary and not narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest
Although conceding that New York could make payments re-
ceived by criminals available to their victims, Simon & Schuster ar-
gued that the Victims Board had failed to prove that it was necessary
for section 632-a to single out only certain speakers and certain ex-
pression in order to achieve the compelling state interest.170
i. Victim compensation
Petitioner noted that the Board had admitted that the State's inter-
est was not to compensate victims in general, but rather only to ben-
efit the victims of criminals who profit by telling the story of their
crime.' 7 ' However, Simon & Schuster contended, victim compensa-
tion cannot explain the restriction of payment only for speech of
specific content, when criminals are left free to receive payments for
non-expressive activity.172 For example, the Board failed to explain
why the statute would not compensate the estate of murder victim
Dr. Herman Tarnower had his killer Jean Harris written exclusively
about prison life without discussing her crime. 17 Additionally, peti-
tioner pointed out that the state interest in victim compensation did
not justify section 632-a reviving an expired claim where a criminal
earned monies through writing about his past crime, but did not re-
vive a claim where a criminal acquired assets in some other way.17 4
Simon & Schuster also noted that the Board had determined that
section 632-a was inapplicable to subway gunman Bernhard
Goetz.1 7 - It directed his victims to the "procedural safeguards con-
tained in the [New York Civil Practice Law and Rules] that can be
used to insure that any assets of Goetz will be available to satisfy any
169. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 126, at 9 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. at 425).
Furthermore, Simon & Schuster noted that with the exception of two cases, which
emphasized the concern for preventing corruption of the political process, the
Court, in the last thirty years, has not upheld a single regulation challenged as
violative of a free speech, when reviewed under strict scrutiny. Id. (citing Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976).
170. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 30.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 31.
173. See Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 549 (N.Y.
1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
174. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 31. Simon & Schuster noted the
Board's concession that the statute had benefitted only victims of a single criminal
since 1977. Id.
175. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 32.
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money judgment obtained against him."1176
ii. Preventing criminals from profiting from or exploiting their
crimes
Petitioner contended that New York's interest in preventing
criminals from profiting from their crimes cannot justify section 632-
a because the speech for which payment is restricted is not the
"profit" of crime, and because the statute is both underinclusive and
overinclusive. 17
7
Simon & Schuster asserted that payments for expression are not
"profits" from crime and cited as support a recent comment by the
Court that "writings... are the fruits of intellectual labor."178 Peti-
tioner argued that the creation of Wiseguy was not a situation where
the financial rewards of publication motivated the crime. 179 The
Victims Board contended that the speech regulated by section 632-
a constituted an "exploitation" of crime which caused an additional
harm and offended the public's "sense of decency." 8 0 In response,
Simon & Schuster argued that this could not justify the statute under
strict scrutiny because neither offensiveness nor suffering from non-
defamatory speech are valid bases for restrictions upon expres-
sion.181 Petitioner also pointed out that the statute dictated that
prior criminal conduct by an author transformed payment for ex-
pression into fruit of the crime.1 8 2 Simon & Schuster contended that
labeling payment for expression as a fruit of the crime improperly
concentrates on the character of the speaker and ignores the consti-
tutional mandate that the focus be on "whether [the law] abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect."183 Fi-
nally, Simon & Schuster emphasized that the creation of fully pro-
tected speech depended on the payments received for such speech
and that prohibitions on such payments were forbidden by the First
Amendment.18 4
176. Id. Simon & Schuster also argued that section 632-a with its differential
treatment and content-basis was underinclusive. Id. at 33 (citing Arkansas Writers'
Project, 481 U.S. at 230); Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583; Carey, 447 U.S. at
465; Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972)).
177. Id. at 34.
178. Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 59 U.S.L.W.
4251, 4252-53 (1991)).
179. See id. at 35.
180. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 35.
181. Id. (citing United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404; Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. at 414; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988)).
182. See id. at 36.
183. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 776 (1978)).
184. Id. Simon & Schuster noted that if a law similar to section 632-a were in
effect at the time and place of publication payments would have been restricted on
works such as: The Autobiography of Malcolm X; Martin Luther King, Jr's Where
Do We Go From Here; Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American
19921
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Assuming arguendo that payments for speech could be consid-
ered as the profits of crime, petitioner argued that the crime-should-
not-pay rationale does not justify section 632-a because at the end
of the escrow period the law provides that any remaining monies be
turned over to the criminal.' 85 Simon & Schuster further contended
that the statute was ill-suited to prevent criminals from profiting from
their crime because it was underinclusive and overinclusive.'8 8
Petitioner asserted that the statute was underinclusive because the
crime-should-not-pay maxim18 7 did not explain the legislature's fail-
ure to attach all the payments that constitute criminal "profits." ' 8
For example, Simon & Schuster raised the question of why payments
to Willie Sutton, a career bank robber engaged as a bank security
consultant after years in prison, were not subject to escrow. 18 9 His
employment and salary clearly could have been considered "fruits"
of his crime because they arose out of his criminal notoriety. Also,
the statute did not address situations in which a criminal profited
from the fictionalization of his criminal experiences.1 90 Simon &
Schuster claimed that the statute was overinclusive because all pay-
ments were subject to the reach of section 632-a even if the crime
were only referred to briefly. 19 1 Simon & Schuster contended, for
example, that had the statute been in place at the time of the publi-
cation of Martin Luther King's Where Do We Go From Here?-
which included a description of his arrest in Birmingham-all pay-
ments to Dr. King would have been subject to the statute.19 2
Slave: Written by Himself; Jean Genet's A Thief's Journal; Tack London's How I
Became A Socialist; John Dean's Blind Innocence; and Henry David Thoreau's On
Civil Disobedience. Id. For an excellent discussion and presentation of the almost
inexhaustible scope of written works by criminals in America between 1789 and
1988, see BRUCE FRANxIm, PIsoN LITERATRE IN AmucA (Oxford University Press,
expanded ed. 1989).
185. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 38. Petitioner noted that the Court has
recognized that "[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the high-
est order,' and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interests [sic] unprohibited." Id. (quot-
ing Florida Star v. BIF, 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (citation omitted in original);
see also N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(4) (McKinney 1982)).
186. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 37-38, 40.
187. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
188. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 38. See also Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 126, at 11-12.
189. Id.
190. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 39. Specifically, the petitioner
illustrated its contention by noting the novels of Herman Melville, Omoo and
Typee, where he drew on his experiences as a mutineer and deserter. Id.
191. Id. at 40.
192. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 40. For a further discussion of the
overinclusiveness of the statute see Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 126, at 12-
13. Simon & Schuster advanced its argument by pointing out the failing of section
632-a by making a comparison to the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3681. Id.
Son of Sam
2. The Respondents 93
a. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a does not directly or substantially
burden free speech
The Crime Victims Board conceded that first amendment protec-
tion extended to a criminal's right to speak, his means of communi-
cating, and the public's right to receive his message. 194 The Board
contended, however, that the First Amendment did not prohibit gov-
ernment from enacting legislation that might reduce a speaker's fi-
nancial incentive to speak.195
i. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a does not prevent criminals from
freely expressing their thoughts and ideas
The Crime Victims Board argued that the effect of section 632-a
on a criminal's incentive to speak was not a violation of the First
Amendment. In support of this argument, the Board emphasized that
the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.196 recognized that "[flreedom of speech
presupposes a willing speaker." '19 7 The Board contended therefore
that someone who speaks only in return for cash is not a willing
speaker.19 8 Respondent noted that if Simon & Schuster had origi-
nally complied with section 632-a, and if Henry Hill had decided
not to cooperate with Nicholas Pileggi-because he wanted an im-
mediate payment-the decision would have been Hill's and not one
mandated by the statute. 199
Respondents analogize section 632-a's reduction of financial in-
centive to other situations where the Court had denied constitutional
protection for speech discouraged by the government's refusal to
provide a monetary incentive to speak.200 First, the Board noted
that the Court had rejected first amendment challenges to provisions
in the federal tax laws and in government benefit programs that
tended to reduce individuals' incentive to speak by reducing the
193. Amii Curiae briefs in support of the Respondents were submitted by: the
United States, the National Organization for Crime Victim Assistance, the Crime
Victims Legal Clinic, the Council of State Governments, the Washington Legal
Foundation, and several states in a joint brief. Counsel of Record for the
Respondents was Mr. Howard L. Zwicld, Chief of the New York State Attorney
General's Litigation Bureau. He was assisted by Susan L. Watson, an Assistant
Attorney General. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 50.
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id.
196. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
197. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 23 (quoting Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 24.
200. Id. at 25.
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total amount of money they had to spend.2 ° ' Second, the Board
noted that in Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States,20 2 the
Court rejected a similar challenge to the Federal Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984.2°3 The Court recognized that the Act did
not violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because, even with the retaining of assets subject to forfeiture, a
criminal was not necessarily prevented from retaining an attorney of
his choosing. 0 4 In denying a Sixth Amendment exception to the
statute, the Court specifically rejected the possibility of a first
amendment exception.
20 5
Respondents emphasized the similarity of section 632-a to the
laws the Court had previously upheld because it argued that like
them, section 632-a did not prevent the exercise of free speech by
criminals and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. 0 6
Since the legislation was aimed at profits and not expression, the
Board contended that O'Brien was the proper standard of review.20 7
ii. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a does not prevent the media from
communicating or profiting from the criminal's
message
The Board argued that section 632-a did not affect the media's
role as the means by which criminals communicate their
message.2 0 8 The Board stressed that the First Amendment protects a
speaker's message and his ability to convey it, but not his ability to
maximize profits. 0 9
Respondents illustrated their argument by examining political
speech and charitable solicitation cases in which the Court's empha-
201. Id. (citing Lying v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988); Began
v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
202. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
203. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 25-26 (citing Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
204. Id. at 26 (citing Caplin & Dzysdale, 491 U.S. at 626).
205. Id. (citing Capin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 628).
206. Id. The Victims Board contended that the statute was not intended to Sup-
press speech and, in fact, did not. The Board asserted that the First Amendment did
not guarantee a criminal's right to profit by selling his story; further, it argued that
speech was not prevented simply because a criminal could not immediately profit.
Id. at 26-27 (quoting St. Martin's Press v. Zweibel (Sup. Ct.), N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26,
1990, at 25 (involving R. Foster Winans's book, Trading Secrets).
207. Id. at 27.
208. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 27-28.
209. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original). See also David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Au-
tonomy and Freedom of Expression, 91 CoL.. L. REv. 334, 335-38 (1991) (con-
tending that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to prohibit the
government from limiting speech "on the ground that the speech is likely to per-
suade people to do something that the government considers harmful").
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sis was on the speaker's ability to speak and not upon his financial
incentive.2 1 0 The Board emphasized, for instance, that in Buckley v.
Valeo,211 the Court struck down expenditure ceiling provisions in
the Federal Election Campaign Act because they infringed upon the
speaker's means of communication. 2  Further, the Board pointed to
Meyer v. Grant in which the Court struck down a Colorado law that
prohibited paid petition circulators,2 1 3 because the petition circula-
tors were the means by which the proponents communicated their
ideas.2 1 ' Respondents also pointed out that the Court had recog-
nized that because charities often use professional fundraisers, any
legislation restricting the amount a charity can spend in fund-raising
activity restricts its means of disseminating its message.2 15 The
Board contended, therefore, that such laws violate the First Amend-
ment because of their restrictions upon the means of communicating
not because of any effect upon the speakers financial incentive. 1 6
iii. Petitioner failed to produce any evidence that N.Y. Exec. Law
section 632-a prevents willing speakers or the media
from communicating 21 7
Respondents argued that Simon & Schuster had not satisfied the
burden required for a claim that a statute is facially invalid under
the First Amendment.2 18 Under New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of New York,2" 9 the Board urged that petitioner "must demon-
strate that the challenged law... 'could never be applied in a valid
manner.' "220
To strengthen this argument, respondents offered motives, other
than profit, to explain why criminals communicate their messages.
They noted for instance that Charles Manson received only the
"chance to have his story heard" as compensation for the book,
Manson: In His Own Words.2 2 1 The Board also asserted that some
criminals speak or write in response to what they have learned in
210. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 29-30 (emphasis in original).
211. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
212. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 29 (emphasis in original).
213. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
214. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 29-30 (emphasis in original).
215. Id. at 30 (quoting Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 967, n.16 (1984) (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
444 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1980))).
216. Id.
217. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 31.
218. Id. at 34.
219. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
220. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 34 (quoting New York Club
Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 11 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984) (emphasis added))).
221. See id. at 31 (quoting N. EimtoNs, MMsoN: IN His OwN Worns 15, 17
(1986)). Respondents also noted that the record suggested that Hill might have
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prison and as part of the rehabilitation process.222 Finally, respon-
dents emphasized that since the enactment of section 632-a, works
involving the cooperation of criminals continued to be produced,
and there has been no record of any statements by criminal speakers
claiming to be discouraged.22
3
b. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a does not single out or impose
differential burdens on the press22 4
In response to petitioner's argument that section 632-a violates
the First Amendment because of its differential treatment of the
press or media, respondents distinguished those cases that had
struck down specialized taxes directed at the press. Respondents
argued that those cases held as they did because the taxes were
directed at, or presented the danger of suppressing particular
ideas.22 -
For example, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Bevenue,22 6 the Court struck down a tax on the cost of
paper and ink used by newspapers. The tax applied disproportion-
ally to the Minneapolis Star, because the newspaper paid roughly
two-thirds of all revenues collected under the tax .27 The Court
concluded that while a general tax on the press could be valid; "dif-
ferential treatment" it suggested that the goal of the regulation was
related to the suppression of speech and therefore was unconstitu-
tional. 12  On the other hand, respondents argued that section 632-a
was not aimed at the press, but was rather an attachment provision
affecting only the profits of criminals, and thus unrelated to the sup-
pression of speech.2 -9
Also, in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Bagland 211 the Court was troubled by the differential treatment of
small segments of the press because it inferred that the govern-
ment's specific goal was to restrict publication by those entities.2 3s
cooperated with Simon & Schuster even without immediate compensation. Id. at
33.
222. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 32 (citing BRUCE Fanum,
PwsoN LrTmATuRE N AmRnucA 127, 181 (1989)).
223. Id. at 33.
224. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 34.
225. Id.
226. 460 U.S.-575 (1983).
227. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 34 (citing Minneapolis Star, 460
U.S. at 576, 578). Cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 21-22.
228. Id. at 35 (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585). The Court struck
down the use tax in Minneapolis Star because it was not narrowly tailored. Minne-
apolis Star, 460 U.S. at 586-90.
229. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 35.
230. 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking down tax which targeted segment of the press
based on content).
231. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 35 (quoting Minneapolis Star,
Therefore, the Board analogized section 632-a's application to an
entity that contracted with a criminal to the general sales tax upon
cable television companies in Leathers v. Medlock.2 s2
c. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a is neither content-based nor
speaker-based
Respondents contended that under Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism21s "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality...
is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be-
cause of disagreement with the message it conveys."23 4 Respon-
dents emphasized that section 632-a did not restrict the discussion of
crimes or the viewpoints of criminals, rather its purpose was to com-
pensate victims.2 3s Further, the Board noted that objective factors
governed the application of the statute and that the statute "d[id] not
employ a sliding scale to determine if the crime spoken of is more
horrible than another.I2 6 The Board argued that the objective na-
ture of its determination and the absence of any evaluation of the
criminal's message distinguished section 632-a from the content-
based statutes in the cases cited by the petitioner.23 7
Furthermore, respondents asserted that the statute was not
speaker-based, because it does not prevent the criminal's message
but rather only requires that he not profit at the expense of his vic-
tims. s2 3  Accordingly, the Board argued that section 632-a did not
contradict the fundamental principle behind the distaste for content-
based regulations: "Mhat 'government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to
those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views'."
2 3 9
460 U.S. at 591-92. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Gros-jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
232. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
233. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, the Court upheld a New York City sound-
amplification regulation on the Bandshell in Central Park. Id. at 803.
234. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 36 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at
791).
235. Id. at 37-38.
236. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 177.
237. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 37 (citing Arkansas Writers'
Project, 481 U.S. 221; Regan v. Time, Inc., 488 U.S. 641 (1984); Police Dep't of
the City of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
238. Id.
239. Id. (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49
(1986) (citation omitted)). Respondents also argued that section 632-a was content-
neutral because under Renton it could be "'justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech."' Id. at 38 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original)). They further stressed that in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, the Court, while applying Renton analysis to uphold sound-amplification
guidelines, had noted that" '[t]he government's purpose is the controlling consider-
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d. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a's minimal impact on the
freedom of speech and the press is outweighed by the
substantial state interest it promotes
Respondents contended that the district court properly held that
section 632-a imposed only an incidental burden on speech and
therefore the O'Brien test was the proper standard of review.24 °
First, the Board noted that Simon & Schuster conceded that New
York had the constitutional authority to enact laws which enabled
victims to obtain compensation from criminals by attaching their
profits.24 1 Second, the Board stressed that section 632-a advanced
a compelling or substantial governmental interest in ensuring that
criminals do not profit by telling their crime stories to the media,
before victims are compensated. 4 2 Third, respondents contended
that the regulation was content-neutral and furthered interests unre-
lated to the suppression of speech.243 Respondents stressed that the
Second Circuit correctly concluded that the purpose of the law was
to guarantee that the criminal's profits would be placed in es-
crow.24 4 Finally, the Victims Board asserted that the governmental
interest behind the legislation, "would be achieved less effectively
absent the [statute]."2 45 The Board further argued that the Ward 246
standard and not a least-restrictive means standard was appropriate.
Under Ward, as long as the means selected to achieve the govern-
ation.'" Id. (quoting 491 U.S. at 791). But see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at
25 (Renton has never been determinative).
For an excellent discussion of Renton and its analysis see supra note 188.
Also, for a more extensive argument of how Renton could be applied to uphold
section 632-a, see Brief of the Council of State Governments at 5-21, Simon &
Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (No. 90-
1059).
240. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 39. But see Brief of Amici Curiae
The Washington Legal Foundation passim Simon & Schuster v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (No. 90-1059) (arguing that a low tier
test was the appropriate standard of review).
241. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 40.
242. Id. at 41. The Board asserted that" 'the statute is a codification of the funda-
mental equitable principle that criminals should not be permitted to profit from
their wrongs... and an expression of the penological concept which provides that
victims expect and are entitled to 'retributive satisfaction' from our criminal justice
system .... '" Id. (citing Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541,
548 (N.Y. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992) (citations omitted)).
243. Id. at 42.
244. Id. But see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 48, at 27 (statute reflects public's
distaste for this speech).
245. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). But see
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The fourth part of the O'Brien test requires that "the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
246. For a background dicussion of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, see supra note
233.
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mental interest are not "substantially broader than necessary," the
statute will not be held invalid merely "because a court concludes
that the government's interest could be adequately served by some
less-speech-restrictive alternative."2 47 Respondents stressed that
section 632-a was not substantially overbroad because its reach was
limited to the profits the criminal derives from discussing or reenact-
ing his crime, and those profits were attached only for the benefit of
the victims of that crime.248
Also, the Board attacked the argument that the statute is unneces-
sary because New York's existing victim compensation remedies are
adequate to satisfy the government's compelling interest, and if in-
adequate, the solution is to expand them.2 49 The Board contended
that expanding Article 62 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules would not effectively provide victims with the opportunity to
be compensated before the criminal received his profits.2s° The
Board argued that a general remedy would not notify victims of the
existence of attachable assets nor would it guarantee that such as-
sets would be held in escrow until the victim could take action to
enforce an attachment.2 5' A broader Article 62 would be unable to
provide the cause of action, statute of limitations, and priority fea-
tures contained in section 632-a. 5
e. N.Y. Exec. Law section 632-a is also necessary to serve and
necessarily tailored to achieve New York's compelling
interest in ensuring that criminals do not
profit from their crimes before
their victims are compensated
Respondents contended that even if the statute imposed a direct
and substantial burden on speech it nevertheless should be upheld
under a strict scrutiny standard, as it had been twice before2S3 be-
247. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. Respondents' reliance on Justice Kennedy's defini-
tion of narrowly tailored in Ward is, however, questionable. Ward dealt with a
time, place and manner regulation as opposed to the content-based challenge ad-
vanced against section 632-a. Id. at 791-93. Under this definition of narrowly tai-
lored, the focus is improperly upon how well the method serves the government
interest as opposed to the correct focus on how restrictive it is upon speech. See id.
at 803-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
248. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 43. Contra section 632-a also
allowed judgment creditors and the state and local governments to reach the crimi-
nal's profits for unpaid taxes. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(1 1)(b), (d) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1991).
249. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 43.
250. See id. at 44. For a discussion of Respondent's arguments that restitution
under N.Y. PNAL LAw section 60.27 (McKinney 1987) is inadequate compared to
section 632-a. See id. at 45.
251. Id. at 44.
252. Id. at 44-45.
253. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 784 (2d Cir. 1990),
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cause it advanced a compelling state interest.254 Respondents main-
tained that New York's compelling interest was to ensure that
criminals do not profit from "storytelling" about their crimes before
their victims are compensated. 25 - The Board argued that the law
was narrowly tailored because its "reach... [was] limited to its pur-
pose."2 56 In response to the argument that the statute was not nar-
rowly tailored because it was both underinclusive and
overinclusive, respondents emphasized that section 632-a did not
reach the profits a criminal received as a result of notoriety, as there
were other methods of attaching such profits.257 Petitioner argued
that section 632-a was underinclusive because relatively few victims
benefitted from it and because criminals could still profit from
"storytelling" under its provisions. 58 It also argued that the statute
was overinclusive because it attached all the profits from a work
even where the crime was only an incidental part. 59 In response,
respondents reasserted what the district court had stressed, that the
Victims Board had no discretion to inquire subjectively into the con-
tents of the work.26 ° Unfortunately, for the Board, the Court could
not agree with its arguments.
III. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. v. MEMBERS OF THE
NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIMS BOARD 2 61
On December 10, 1991, the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously2 62 struck down New York Executive Law section 632-a,
rev'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d
541, 550 (N.Y. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
254. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 45-46.
255. Id. at 46. Responding to Simon & Schuster's argument that New York could
not define its interest in terms of what the statute actually does, the Board asserted
that section 632-a was created to benefit a unique class of victims, the victims of
criminals who profit by storytelling about their crimes, and aimed to ensure that
they were compensated before the criminals received any such profits. Id. at 47. It
contended that the compelling interest stood on its own footing. Id. Austin v. Mich-
igan Chambers of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397-98 (1990).
256. Id. at 47 (quoting Children of Bedford, Inc., 573 N.E.2d at 550).
257. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 48 (quoting Simon & Schuster,
916 F.2d at 784).
258. Id. at 48.
259. See id. at 40-41.
260. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 48 (citing Simon & Schuster, 724
F. Supp. at 177-78). The Board also asserted that "'[the state's] interest requires
that the entire proceeds due the criminal be available to the victim, whether or not
the victim's story is a small or large part of the book.'" Id. at 49 (quoting Simon &
Schuster, 916 F.2d at 784).
261. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
262. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia and Souter. Justices Blackmun and Kennedy
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holding it to be "inconsistent with the First Amendment. ' 263 The
decision recognized that a statute which "single[d] out" the income
from expression of specific content for a financial burden that New
York imposed on no other income could not survive review under
the strict scrutiny standard.264 The Court justified exacting review
of the statute on the general proposition that content-based regula-
tions on expression are presumptively unconstitutional.265
Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor reaffirmed
the fundamental incompatibility of content-based regulations with
the freedom of expression, 2 6 s a notion so ingrained in our first
amendment jurisprudence that... it [is] so 'obvious' as not to require
explanation. 26 7 Justice O'Connor identified the danger of al-
lowing the imposition of financial burdens on expression based on
content as the "rais[ing] [of] the specter that the government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
place."126 8 The Court recognized that section 632-a was such a con-
tent-based regulation, because it placed a "financial disincentive"
only on expression of a specific content.26 9
Before applying the strict scrutiny analysis to the statute, Justice
O'Connor addressed and dismissed several of the Crime Victims
Board's arguments. First, she rejected the Board's attempt to distin-
guish section 632-a from the tax in Arkansas Writers' Project v.
Ragland by pointing out that the regulation in that case took a per-
centage of the speaker's income outright while section 632-a only
placed the speaker's money in escrow.2 70 Second, the Court dis-
filed concurring opinions, while Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Id.
263. Id. at 512.
264. Id. at 508.
265. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct.
1438, 1443-44 (1991)). The Court has "invalidated almost every content-based
restriction that it has considered." Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulafions and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 196 (1983). See also Reply Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 126, at 9 (Only two statutes alleged to be violative of free
speech have survived strict scrutiny review by the Court in the last three decades.).
266. "'[O]fficial scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a
tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the
press.'" Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)).
267. Id. at 508 (citing Leathers, 499 U.S. at -, - (slip op. at 6-7)). The Court
further stressed that: "'Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate
on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment.' "Id. (quoting Began v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984), and
citing Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
268. Id. (citing Leathers, 499 U.S. -, - (slip op., at 6-7)).
269. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508. Justice O'Connor noted that the Son of
Sam law remained content-based in nature regardless of whether the "speaker"
was considered to be Henry Hill ... or Simon & Schuster. Id.
270. Id.
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missed the Board's claim that discriminatory financial treatment is
only suspect when the legislature's intention is to suppress certain
ideas.271 Justice O'Connor specifically stressed that "[illicit legisla-
tive intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amend-
ment."21 72 Finally, she recognized the weakness of the Board's
argument that section 632-a was not directed specifically at the me-
dia, but rather at any "entity" contracting with a convicted person
and that the law therefore should not be subject to strict scrutiny. 2 7 3
Justice O'Connor noted that any "entity" contracting with a con-
victed person "becomes by definition a medium of communication,
if it wasn't one already. 21 74 The Court pointed out that the "Gov-
ernment's power to impose content-based financial disincentives on
speech does not vary with the identity of the speaker.1275
Next, the Court recognized that because of the Son of Sam law's
differential treatment of expression, the proper standard of constitu-
tional review was the strict scrutiny test.276 In examining New
York's interest behind the statute, Justice O'Connor found undis-
puted compelling interests in ensuring that victims of crime are com-
pensated by those who harm them277 and in ensuring that criminals
do not profit from their crimes. 278 However, she rejected the con-
tention that the State had a compelling interest in "'ensuring that
criminals do not profit from storytelling about their crimes before
their victims have a meaningful opportunity to be compensated for
271. Id. at 509.
272. Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor noted that it has
been "'long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental con-
cerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amend-
ment.' Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592).
273. Id.
274. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
275. Id.
276. Id. The Court stated that" 'the State must show that its regulation is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end."' Id. (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 231).
277. Id. Justice O'Connor considered the existence of New York's statutory pro-
visions for prejudgment remedies and orders of restitution to be illustrations of its
interest in "preventing wrongdoers from dissipating their assets before victims can
recover." Id. at 509-10 (citing N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & R. 6201-6226 (McKinney 1980
& Supp. 1991); N.Y. PExAL LAw § 60.27 (McKinney 1987)). The Court noted that it
had previously "recognized the importance of this interest [ ] in the Sixth Amend-
ment context." Id. at 510 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989)).
278. Id. The Court recognized this interest to be a" 'fundamental equitable prin-
ciple.'" Id. (quoting Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d at 548). It
further considered the interest to be demonstrated by New York's provisions for the
forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Id. (citing N.Y. Civ. PeAc.
L. & R. 1310-1352 (McKinney Supp. 1991). Also, the Court declined to address
the issue of whether publication royalties can be considered the profits of crime, it
proceeded on the assumption that such monies were the fruits of crime. Id.
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their injuries.' ,2 7 9 The Court could not find any justification for a
distinction between the criminal's income from such "storytelling"
and any of his other assets.28 0 Also, the Court questioned limiting
the sources for compensation to speech income.28 1
Turning to the second element of the test, Justice O'Connor reaf-
firmed Judge Newman's rejection of the Board's circular defense
that portrayed the statute as "narrowly tailored" by positing its ob-
jective as New York's interest.2 8 2 Furthermore, she agreed with
Newman's dissent that the danger of this argument is that it could
"ehminate[ ] the entire inquiry concerning the validity of content-
based discriminations.1 28 3 Justice O'Connor held that section 632-
a was "significantly overinclusive" as a method of ensuring that vic-
tims are compensated from the proceeds of crime.28 4 She found
that the scope of the statute and the broad definition of "person con-
victed of a crime" enabled the statute to reach a wide range of liter-
ature and prevented criminals from profiting from expression but
left victims uncompensated. 28 5 The Court emphasized that since
section 632-a regulates "works on any subject, [which] express the
author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangen-
tially or incidentally," it could have resulted in placing the royalties
for works of prominent figures such as Malcolm X, Henry Thoreau,
Saint Augustine, Martin Luther King, Jr., Sir Walter Raleigh, and
Jesse Jackson in escrow.2 8 6
279. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510 (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra
note 20, at 46) (emphasis added).
280. Id. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court in Arkansas Writers' Project
and Minneapolis Star had previously rejected such differential treatment. Id. (cit-
ing Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 231, and Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at
586). She also stressed that section 632-a's distinction between a criminal's speech
income and other assets has no relationship to New York's interest in compensating
victims from their wrongdoers' assets. Id. Further, the Court compared the Son of
Sam law to the privacy statute it struck down in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467-
69 (1980) (" 'nothing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction has any bear-
ing whatsoever on privacy.' '). Id.
281. Id. at 511.
282. Id. at 510-11 (quoting Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J.,
dissenting)).
283. Id. at 510.
284. In recognizing the statute to be overinclusive, the Court noted that it need
not address Respondents' argument that section 632-a is content neutral under its
decisions in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), and Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). It came to this determination because
the test under both those cases, like strict scrutiny, requires that the statute be "nar-
rowly tailored." See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511-12.
285. Id.
286. Id. The Court, in referring to the bibliography submitted by the Association
of American Publishers, Inc. as Amicus, also expressed concern about the infinite
number of works which could be affected by the statute. Id. Further, in reflecting
on the dangers of the scope of the statute and its overinclusiveness, it speculated on
the hypothetical situation, where the royalties from the memoirs of a prominent fig-
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Justice O'Connor concluded by limiting the Court's holding that
section 632-a was not "narrowly tailored" and therefore was invalid
under the First Amendment. Justice O'Connor limited the Court's
holding exclusively to the New York statute, thus leaving the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of similar statutes enacted by other states
and by the federal government.2 s7 Having determined that the stat-
ute was overinclusive, Justice O'Connor declined to address Justice
Harry A. Blackmun's contention that the statute was also underinclu-
sive.2 s s She also declined to address Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
contention that content-based regulations of expression should be
per se unconstitutional.28 9
Although it reached the correct result, the Court failed to distin-
guish officially between the two distinct forms of content-based re-
strictions on expression; subject-matter discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination. 29 ° The Court also failed to establish strict scrutiny
as the appropriate standard of review for viewpoint discrimination
or its equivalent.291
IV. RECOGNIZING VIEWPOINT-BASED
DISCRIMINATION: AVOIDING THE "DILUTION"
OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
In framing a theory of free speech the first obstacle is the insis-
tence of many very intelligent people that the "First Amendment
is an absolute."2
9 2
As previously discussed, Justice O'Connor based her application
of the strict scrutiny standard upon the determination that section
ure could be escrowed and made available to his creditors, because of a brief ref-
erence to "having stolen (in New York) a nearly worthless item as a youthful prank
...." Id. at 512.
287. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
288. See id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Blackmun argued that the Court should provide the states with guidance in this
area by addressing the underinclusiveness of the statute. Id. at 512. Providing
such guidance, however, would border on the rendering of an advisory opinion
and the fact remains that "[t]he core of Article III's limitation on federal judicial
power is that federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions." Enwm Czmenmusxsy,
FEDERAL JwusoRTioN § 2.2, at 43 (1989). The prohibition against advisory opinions
involves an enforcement of the separation of powers and a recognition that cases
require concrete questions in order to be adjudicated. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968). For a further discussion of this topic see JoHN E. NowA,
RoNALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CoNsrTrU'noNAL, Law § 2.12, at 56-59 (3d ed.
1986).
289. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
290. See infra notes 302-27 and accompanying text.
291. See infra notes 338-55 and accompanying text.
292. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1971).
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632-a was a content-based regulation of expression.293 The Court
failed to see the danger of relying on such a general proposition to
base the application of strict scrutiny. The author of this Comment
contends that such reliance creates the possibility that the protection
of strict scrutiny will be "diluted." The notion of content-based reg-
ulations can be more precisely divided into subject-matter restric-
tions 294 and viewpoint-based discriminations. 295 It is the latter that
is the most inconsistent with the fundamental purpose 29 6 of the First
Amendment and therefore requires the most stringent review. 97
This Part will review the distinction between the two forms and dis-
cuss how the New York statute was the equivalent of viewpoint dis-
crimination. It will argue that the Court should expressly recognize
the danger of viewpoint discrimination by limiting the use of strict
scrutiny review to cases involving viewpoint-based discrimination or
its equivalent..2 9 8 The author of this Comment contends that the lim-
itation is necessary in order to prevent the "dilution" of the protec-
tion that strict scrutiny review provides for the guarantee of the First
Amendment. 9 9
293. Simon &Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
294. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Resti'ctions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 81 (1978).
295. For an excellent discussion of the nature of viewpoint discrimination see
Comment, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102
HANv. L. REv. 1904, 1913-17 (1989).
296. "[The amendment in principle protects only 'political' speech-speech that
participates in the processes of representative democracy .... ." Lillian R. BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and
Limits of Principle, 30 STAx. L. REv. 299, 300 (1978). See also New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) ("the central meaning of the First Amend-
ment" is the protection of the debate of public issues); A. Mzxiuoi, FREE SPEECH
AM ITS RELTION TO Sm -Govumnwr (1948); see Bork, supra note 292, at 27. But
see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Ywx
L.J. 877, 878 (1963). This Comment does not contend that the protection of "polit-
ical speech" was necessarily the primary goal of the Framers. Rather it recognizes
quite the opposite. See Bork, supra note 292, at 22 ("The framers seem to have had
no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned
with the subject."). For a detailed discussion of the early history of the First
Amendment, see David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 CoLuM. L. Bv.
1699, 1704-17 (1991).
297. See Comment, supra note 295, at 1920; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regula-
tion and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. Ruv. 189, 200 (1983).
298. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued that the holding of the statute to
be content-based was "full and sufficient reason" to find it unconstitutional. Simon
& Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501, 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, the ultimate
danger of imposing aper se standard is the same as applying too general a test. An
absolute test results in absolute exceptions, which in turn water-down the protection
afforded the speech deserving stringent review. Justice Kennedy himself recog-
nizes the permissibility of restrictions being placed on certain categories of speech.
See id. at 514 (obsenity, defamation, incitement, and grave and imminent danger).
299. It is well-established that there is no coherent theory of first amendment ju-
risprudence. See Paul B. Stephen, MII, The frsf amendment and Content Discrimi-
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A. The Distinction Between Subject-Matter Restrictions and
Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
In recent years the Court has determined the level of scrutiny ap-
plicable to government actions effecting expression by distinguish-
ing between content-based300 and content-neutral 301 regulations.3 02
Within the realm of content-based discriminations, however, the
Court has not officially recognized its tendency to impose more de-
manding scrutiny upon viewpoint-based discrimination as opposed
to subject-matter restrictions.30 3 On the other hand, commenta-
tors304 have approved of applying stringent scrutiny to viewpoint-
based discriminations.30 5
1. Subject-Matter Restrictions
Subject-matter restrictions are targeted at entire topics of expres-
sion.30 6 Since subject-matter restrictions are not directed at particu-
lar ideas, viewpoints or items of information, they are less likely to
distort public debate.307 Nonetheless, subject-matter restrictions
have been a source of great confusion for the Supreme Court. In
certain cases, the Court has labelled subject-matter restrictions as
viewpoint-based and has applied exacting scrutiny,308 while in
other cases the Court has treated them as content-neutral and has
applied a flexible balancing test.309 It has been argued that be-
nation, 68 VA. L. RIv. 203, 207 (1982); BeVier, supra note 296, at 299. The
danger, however, of allowing a general presumption against content-based regula-
tions to act as the safeguard against viewpoint-discriminations is that the protection
may fall short.
300. For an excellent discussion of based analysis see Stone, supra note 294, at
194-97.
301. See generally Stone, supra note 294, for a discussion of the principle of
content-neutral regulations of speech.
302. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment,
139 U. PA. L. Rv. 615, 616 (1991).
303. Comment, supra note 295, at 1915.
304. Extensive writing has been done in this area. See generally Williams, supra
note 302; Stone, supra note 294; Stone, supra note 297; Paul B. Stephen, First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. 8Ev. 113 (1981); BeVier, supra note 296; Com-
ment, supra note 295; Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expres-
sion, 96 Hav. L. REv. 1854 (1983).
305. See Stone, supra note 297, at 200; Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction
in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 117 (1981); Comment, supra
note 295, at 1913.
306. See Stone, supra note 297, at 239.
307. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
308. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
309. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Lehman v.
Son of Sam
cause subject-matter restrictions appear viewpoint-neutral, they
should be treated differently than other content-based regula-
tions.3 1 0 Classic examples of subject-matter restrictions are the ob-
senity cases.3 11 The Court has repeatedly held31 2 that, even though
obsenity requires subject-matter categorization, it receives no first
amendment protection.3 1 3
For example, in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents,31 4 the Supreme Court held that New York Education Law sec-
tion 122-a was unconstitutional because the law restricted the
expression of a particular viewpoint.3 15 The statute proscribed the
licensing of the film Lady Cbatterley's Lover, because the movie
presented "'acts of sexual immorality... as desirable, acceptable
or proper patterns of behavior.' "316 It can be argued from this de-
cision that the primary concern of the content distinction is view-
point discrimination and not subject-matter restrictions.31 7
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
310. In American Mini 7Teatres, Justice Stevens held that strict scrutiny was not
the appropriate standard of review where a Detroit zoning ordinance required thea-
tres exhibiting sexually explicit-but not obscene-movies to be dispersed
throughout the city; this remained so even though the restriction was content-based.
See America Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71. He contended the basis of the rule
against content-based regulations is "the need for absolute neutrality by the gov-
ernment; its regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hos-
tility for the point of view being expressed by the communicator." Id. at 67.
Accordingly, he applied a more lenient standard of review. However, several com-
mentators have pointed out that regulations that are facially subject-matter-oriented
are viewpoint discriminatory in effect. Richard L. Barnes, Regulations of Speech
Intended to Affect Behavior, 63 Dmiv. U. L. REv. 37, 53-54 (1985); Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment, A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vmum. L.
REv. 265, 285 (1981); Stone, supra note 294, at 109-11.
311. See Redish, supra note 305, at 117. The acceptability of subject-matter re-
strictions is not limited to obsenity. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (commercial speech); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976) (commercial speech).
312. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Both v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
313. See Redish, supra note 305, at 117.
314. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
315. Id. at 688.
316. Id. at 685 (quoting N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 122-a (McKinney Supp. 1958)).
317. See Redish, supra note 305, at 118. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Comment, a proposed test for subject-matter restrictions is the intermediate scrutiny
standard of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)
(regulation can be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech"). For a full discussion of this proposal see Comment, supra note 295, at
1912-23.
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2. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
Viewpoint discriminatory statutes seek to restrict particular ideas,
viewpoints or sources of information and thus contradict the core of
first amendment guarantees.3 18 They are presumptively unconstitu-
tional because they distort the thought processes of the commu-
nity.3 19 They proscribe the expression of a specific message "at all
times, in all places in all manners."3 20 First Amendment jurispru-
dence is driven by a fear of viewpoint-based discriminations.32 1
Subject-matter restrictions distort the process of sell-government by
regulating discussion about particular issues; on the other hand,
viewpoint-based discrimination results in far greater distortion be-
cause by favoring one side of a debate, it can determine the out-
come of the debate. 22 Moreover, it is a fundamental first
amendment precept that the government may not restrict speech
merely because it disagrees with the speaker's views, 23 nor may it
provide preferential treatment for views with which it agrees.32 4
Therefore, it is no wonder commentators urge that strict scrutiny be
limited to reviews of viewpoint-based discrimination. 25
3. N.Y. Exec. Law Section 632-a: A Subject-Matter Restriction
that is Speaker-Based is the Equivalent of a Viewpoint-
Based Discrimination
The threat that viewpoint-based discrimination poses to first
amendment values is that it significantly distorts public debate by
eliminating or favoring one side of an argument.32 ' Such distortion
of public debate is an attack upon "core" first amendment protec-
tion.3 27 Although subject-matter restrictions are recognized as less
of a threat to freedom of expression, when such restrictions target
specific speakers, they skew public discussion as effectively as view-
point-based regulations.3 28 Therefore, these restrictions require the
318. "'If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'" Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at
509 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
319. See Stone, supra note 297, at 217.
320. Id. at 224.
321. See Comment, supra note 295, at 1917.
322. See id. at 1913-14. See also Williams, supra note 302, at 655 (viewpoint-
based discrimination is the most biased regulation of expression).
323. See Stone, supra note 297, at 227-28 n.133.
324. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categori-
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. ..v. 1482, 1507
(1975).
325. See Comment, supra note 295, at 1917.
326. See infra notes 338-54 and accompanying text.
327. See id.
328. Another possible argument is that New York's Son of Sam law was in fact a
viewpoint-discriminatory statute. This argument is based on the contention that
Son of Sam
same stringent scrutiny applicable to pure viewpoint-based
discriminations.
Section 632-a is such a regulation. First, it is on its face a subject-
matter restriction. 29 It restrains the dissemination of expression on
the subject of crime. The statute is not a pure viewpoint-based re-
striction because it restricts a broad category of speech and not
speech expressing a specific view on a particular issue.330 More-
over, section 632-a has the added dimension of being a speaker-
based restriction.3 31 Its restrictiops are targeted exclusively at "con-
victed persons.' '332 The singling out of certain specific groups pro-
duces an inequality in first amendment protection.3 3 3 Additionally,
there is usually a strong correlation between speaker identity and
viewpoint, and therefore speaker-based restrictions can have view-
point discriminatory effects.3 3 4 Accordingly, such restrictions, be-
cause of their ability to distort public debate significantly, should
receive the same stringent scrutiny applied to viewpoint discrimina-
tory regulations.3 3s
B. Reserving Strict Scrutiny for Review of Viewpoint-Based
Restrictions or Its Equivalent: The Justification
Presently, first amendment doctrine is in a state of dangerous con-
fusion. 3 6 The presumption against the constitutionality of content-
based regulations generally influences whether strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review for restrictions on expression.3 3 7
The Court has not expressly recognized an elevated standard of re-
view for "core"33 8 first amendment speech.3 3 9 The danger of ap-
plying strict scrutiny under the general content-based classification
is that such a broad-sweeping application of the standard might "di-
viewpoint-based restrictions can be defined by their discriminatory effect rather
than by the distortion of an actual, ongoing debate. For example, some commenta-
tom have interpreted Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), usu-
ally viewed as a subject-matter case, to be an example of viewpoint discrimination
because of the ordinance's effect. See Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 Gno. L.J 727, 734-37 (1980).
329. The statute restricts convicted persons from reflecting their "thoughts, feel-
ings, opinions or emotions regarding [their] crime." N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1982).
330. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
331. For a more detailed discussion of speaker-based restrictions see Stone, supra
note 292, at 244-51.
332. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
333. See Stone, supra note 297, at 248.
334. Id. at 249.
335. Id.
336. See Stephen, supra note 299, at 206.
337. See supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
338. See infra notes 343-50 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text.
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lute" the protection that scrutiny affords the most valued expres-
sion. 40 This "dilution effect" can be avoided by reserving the
application of strict scrutiny exclusively to reviews of viewpoint-
based discriminations or their equivalent.
Admittedly, it is well established that there is no "adequate or
comprehensive theory of the First Amendment. '3 4 1 Some of the
most prominent scholars,3 42 however, have recognized that the par-
amount objective of the First Amendment3 43 is to guarantee that
"political speech" receives the greatest possible protection. 44
Even the Supreme Court has agreed with this proposition; in Carey
v. Brown 3 45 it declared that debate on public issues "has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values."1
3 4 6
The late Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, the foremost first
amendment philosopher, stressed that the denial of information or
opinions concerning a public issue is the "mutilation of the thinking
process of the community against which the First Amendment to the
Constitution is directed.' 3 47 Further, he added that "[t]he principle
of freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of
self-government" and "[i]t is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suf-
frage."34 8 Similarly, Judge/Professor Robert H. Bork contended
that the Constitution created "a form of government that would be
meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its poli-
340. See Stephen, supra note 299, at 206; Comment, supra note 295, at 1918-19.
341. Emerson, supra note 1, at 877.
342. See A. M mn.;oQJ, FR SPcEH mw Is RELATION TO SELP-Govmwl~mr (1948);
Au4Dx R M. Bxcmm, THE Molu=aTY oF CosErr (1975); Bork, supra note 292.
343. The contention that the primary goal of the First Amendment is the protec-
tion of "political speech" is a result of contemporary first amendment jurispru-
dence. The Framers made no such explicit declarations. In fact they often acted
and wrote in quite the opposite manner. For example, in regards to the attacks of
the Federalist press, Thomas Jefferson wrote to Governor McKean of Pennsylvania
suggesting that "a few prosecutions of the most prominent offenders would have a
wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the presses." Emerson, supra note 1,
at 888 (quoting 8 TmE Wnrruos oF THoMAS JEmruoi 216, 218 (Ford ed. 1897))
(letter to Governor McKean, Feb. 19, 1803).
344. See BeVier, supra note 296, at 300. Alexander Meiklejohn went so far as to
contend that the First Amendment had no concern with protecting private speech.
Mmmajom{, infra note 347, at 94. To maintain the protection afforded political
speech, Meiklejohn stressed that "we (must] draw sharply and clearly the line which
separates the public welfare of the community from the private goods of any indi-
vidual citizen or groups of citizens." Id.
345. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
346. Id. at 467.
347. A. MEoLEJoHN, Po,.icAL FREEDoM: THE CONSTrrTUTIONA PowE8 oF TIE PEOPL.E
27 (1960) (emphasis in the original).
348. Id.
Son of Sam
cies.I ' 49 It follows that there is a dependent relationship between
the exchange of diverse viewpoints and the functioning of a repre-
sentative democracy.3 50
Therefore, in order to secure the protection afforded to "political
speech," the Court, which has noted a hierarchy of first amendment
values, should recognize a hierarchy of categories of expression. 5 1
Since viewpoint-based discriminations cause the greatest distortion
of public debate, they should be subject to the most stringent scru-
tiny available. True strict scrutiny should be applied exclusively to
viewpoint-based discriminations, because the expression of particu-
lar views, opinions and ideas is essential to effective "political
speech. 35 2  The standard of review should reflect the fact that
viewpoint-based restrictions strike at the "core" of first amendment
guarantees.
CONCLUSION
"The First Amendment is not, primarily, a device for the winning
of new truth... its [primary] purpose is to give to every voting mem-
ber of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the under-
standing of those problems with which the citizens of a self-
governing society must deal." 5 ' Public debate is the essence and
foundation of our representative democracy.3s 4 Unfortunately,
there can be an extraordinarily high cost to maintaining our unique
form of government vis-a-vis the First Amendment. Americans since
the time of the Framers have been willing to make the ultimate sacri-
fice. Although crime victims deserve all the assistance available, 55
349. Bork, supra note 292, at 23.
350. "[Tlhough citizens may, on other grounds, be barred from speaking, they
may not be barred because their views are thought to be false or dangerous."
WnuEoml, supra note 347, at 27. Professor Meildejohn further contended that,
"no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the
issue rather than another." Id. at 26-27. See also Stephen, supra 299, at 206-09.
The application of a middle tier test to subject-matter restrictions would not result in
a reduction of the freedom of expression. See Farber, supra note 328, at 760. For
example, the ordinance in Mosley would have still been struck down under such a
review. Id.
351. See Comment, supra note 295, at 1917.
352. "It requires careful examination of the structure and functioning of our polit-
ical system as a whole to see what part the principle of the freedom of speech plays,
here and now, in that system." MnuxjoHN, supra note 347, at 20.
353. Id. at 75.
354. "The unabridged freedom of public discussion is the rock on which our gov-
ernment stands." Id. at 77.
355. However, during its existence the New York Son of Sam law was of little
assistance to victims. Since its enactment in 1977, ExEcurivs LAw section 632-a
froze only $164,994. See Daniel Wise, Passage of New Son of Sam Law Seems
Unlikely; State Netted Paltry Sum From Convicted Authors, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12,
1991, at 1 [hereinafter Passage Unlikely]. But see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Na-
tional Organization for Victims Assistance, Security on Campus, Inc., the National
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such aid can not conflict with the "core" of first amendment protec-
tions. In the instant case, there is no conflict between the First
Amendment or compensating victims. The answer for victims can
be provided by the New York legislature, which is free to draft an
improved compensation statute that does not "single out" speech. 6 6
Relief lies in the functioning of the very political system that the Si-
mon & Schuster decision guarantees by assuring public debate.
One can only hope that strict scrutiny will continue to protect repre-
sentative democracy.
Ralph W. Johmson, HI
Organization of Crime Victim Compensation Boards, and White Collar Crime 101
in Support of Respondent, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059).
356. The Court concluded that the problem with the New York statute was that it
"singled out" speech. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 512. Also, Ronald
S. Rauchberg who represented Simon & Schuster stated that he felt the first amend-
ment defect, the statute's singling out income generated from speech-related activ-
ity, could easily be remedied. Passage Unlikely, supra note 355.
